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COMMENTS
QUASI-CONTRACTUAL RECOVERY
Breach of Oral Contract to Perform Services
In Exchange for Compensation by Will
By JoHN PouLos*
AN AGREEMENT to perform services in exchange for compen-
sation to be made by will is within the California Statute of Frauds,'
and unless there is either compliance therewith in the form of a suffi-
cient writing, or the party seeking to enforce the oral contract can
bring himself within the purview of one of the recognized exceptions
to the statutory requirement of a sufficient writing, 2 no action may be
maintained upon the oral contract. 3 However, if there has been per-
formance of services under such an oral contract which does not
qualify as one of the above exceptions, although no action may be
brought on the oral contract, recovery of the reasonable value of the
services thus performed may be had under a quasi-contractual theory.4
Effect of Statute of Frauds
It is clear that the Statute of Frauds will prevent parol proof of
an oral contract that is within the scope of the Statute when an action
is brought upon that oral contract. This is so by direct command of
the Statute. But when an action is brought not upon the oral contract,
but in quasi-contract to recover the reasonable value of the perform-
ance rendered pursuant to the oral contract, the Statute should not
prevent the admission of the parol contract into evidence to establish
a necessary element of the cause of action. Thus most jurisdictions
which permit recovery of the reasonable value of the services so per-
formed, aside from any issue involving the application of the appro-
priate statute of limitations, do so permit the oral contract, albeit
unenforceable as it may be, to be introduced into evidence to estab-
lish the elements of the quasi-contractual recovery; 5 that the perform-
Member, Second Year class.
1 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624 (6); CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1973 (6).
2 See generally I WITKIN, SUM1MARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw Contracts §§ 87-93, 108-
14 (7th ed. 1960).
3 As to part performance and estoppel in California, see Part Performance, Estoppel,
and the California Statute of Frauds, 3 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1951); Note 37 CALIF. L. REV.
151 (1949); Note 20 CALIF. L. REV. 663 (1932).
4 E.g., Zelner v. Wassman, 184 Cal. 80, 193 Pac. 84 (1920). See Annot., 31 A.L.R.
129, 138-45 (1924); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 355 (1932); RESTATEMENT, RESTITU-
TION § 108 (d) (1936); 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 534 (rev. ed. 1960).
See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 217 (2) (1932).
[ 408 ]
COMMENTS
ance was not gratuitously rendered,G and as evidence of the reasonable
value of the unjust enrichment.7
If prior to 1926 any doubt existed in California as to the effect of
the California Statute of Frauds upon the oral contract it was dispelled
in Offeman v. Robertson-Cole Studios." In that case the court clearly
recognized the majority view that the Statute of Frauds does not forbid
the existence of a parol contract that is within its purview and does
not comply therewith, but rather that the contract is rendered unen-
forceable when the defense which the Statute creates is appropriately
invoked. Thus when the defense of the Statute of Frauds was set up
on an action on the oral contract, all parol proof of the existence or
terms of that contract must be excluded. If the action was not on
the contract itself, since such an action was not what the Statute of
Frauds was intended to prevent, the terms of the contract could be
proved. The fact that admission included the terms of the unenforce-
able contract was completely immaterial; therefore, the terms of the
6 E.g., La Rue v. Barr, 279 Pac. 1019 (Cal. D.C.A. 1929), aff'd, 208 Cal. 493, 282
Pac. 10 (1929); Downey v. Guilfoile, 96 Conn. 383, 114 Ad. 73 (1921); Appeal of
Beardsley, 83 Conn. 34,75 At]. 141 (1910); Humphrey v. Johnson, 73 Ind. App. 551, 127
N.E. 819 (1920); Longhofer v. Herbel, 83 Kan. 278, 111 Pac. 483 (1910); Laughnan v.
Laughnan's Estate, 165 Wis. 348, 162 N.W. 169 (1917); Martin v. Martin's Estate, 108
Wis. 284, 84 N.W. 439 (1900).
7The weight of authority allows introduction of the oral contract on the issue of the
reasonable value of the services when the promise is to pay a sum of money. Carter Coal
Co. v. Nelson, 91 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1937); Offeman v. Robertson-Cole Studios, 80 Cal.
App. 1, 251 Pac. 830 (1926) (contract not to be performed within one year); Wilbur v.
Cedar Rapids & M. R. Ry. Co., 116 Iowa 61, 89 N.W. 100 (1902) (contract not to be per-
formed within one year); Wise v. Midtown Motors, 231 Minn. 46, 42 N.W.2d 404, 20
A.L.R.2d. 735 (1950) (contract not to be performed within one year); Cochran v. Bise,
197 Va. 483, 90 S.E.2d 178 (1955); Annot., 49 A.L.R. 1121 (1927); of. Crocker v.
United States, 240 U.S. 74 (1915); Clark v. United States, 95 U.S. 539 (1877). Where
the promise is to convey or devise an interest in land the apparent weight of authority
will allow introduction of the oral contract on the issue of the reasonable value of the
services. Oxborough v. St. Martin, 119 Minn. 72, 210 N.W. 854, 49 A.L.R. 115 (1926)
(promise to convey in return for professional services rendered); Dean v. Wilson, 178
N.C. 600, 101 S.E. 205 (1919) (promise to convey in exchange for personal services);
Lisk v. Sherman, 25 Barb. 433 (N.Y. 1857); 2 CoRniN, CoNTRAcTs § 328 (1950); 3
WmLsroN, CoNTRAcrs § 536 (rev. ed. 1960); See cases collected Arnot., 49 A.L.R.
1121, 1124. Contra, La Rue v. Barr, supra note 6; Fuller v. Reed, 38 Cal. 99 (1869);
see cases collected Annot., 49 A.L.R. 1121, 1124. See also Annot., Ann. Cas. 1913 A, 288.
Additionally, the unenforceable contract has also been admitted into evidence as between
the parties to the contract to show, for example, the circumstances under which plaintiff
went into possession of land and expended money for which he seeks to recover, Blank v.
Rodgers, 82 Cal. App. 35, 255 Pac. 235 (1927), and to explain possession in an action of
unlawful detainer, Covina Manor, Inc. v. Hatch, 133 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 790, 284 P.2d
580 (1955). By the great weight of authority the oral contract cannot be attacked by a
third person on the basis of the Statute of Frauds, and it can form the basis of a tort
action against the third person. E.g., Ryan v. Tomlison, 39 Cal. 639 (1870); Yarber v.
Iglehardt, 264 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
8 80 Cal. App. 1, 251 Pac. 830 (1926).
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oral contract could be admitted as some evidence of the reasonable
value of the services performed. The court then distinguished the case
of Fuller v. Reed,9 which refused to admit the oral contract for the
purpose of establishing the reasonable value of the services rendered,
on two grounds: 1. That the court in that case had in mind the question
of admitting the oral contract, not as some proof of the reasonable
value of the services, but as the measure of recovery, and; 2. That the
Statute of Frauds in effect at the time the case was decided 0 had
been interpreted as making the oral contract void in toto rather than
unenforceable.
The narrow issue, as to whether or not the oral contract could be
used as evidence of the reasonable value of the services, was again
before the courts in the case of La Rue v. Barr." In that case the
court of appeals refused to admit the terms of the oral contract as
evidence of the reasonable value of the services sought to be recovered,
under an oral contract for compensation of the services by devise,
although admitting the oral contract for the purpose of establishing
the existence of the cause of action. The court distinguished this aspect
of the Offeman case on the grounds that the promise contained in the
contract in that case was for a sum of money, rather than a promise
to devise land, which, of course, has no face value. This court rea-
soned that the jury would then have to hear evidence as to the value
of the land and this, they asserted, would be the creation of a new
issue and as such it would lead to confusion, therefore it must be
excluded for these purposes. The court then cited Fuller v. Reed with
approval.
The reasons given by the court in the La Rue case are not com-
pelling. The Offeman case demonstrated that the factor of unenforce-
ability did not prevent the contract's admission into evidence. Strictly
speaking, as far as the Statute of Frauds is concerned, there is no
logical distinction to be drawn on the basis of the subject matter of
the promise of the oral contract and its admission into evidence. It
would appear that once the Statute has been interpreted so as to make
a contract unenforceable, but admissible as some evidence in an action
not on that contract, then it would equally apply to all contracts
within the Statute. If the refusal to admit the terms of the oral con-
tract as evidence of the reasonable value of the services is independent
of the fact of its enforceability, does lack of a face value of the subject
matter of the promise justify the exclusion, as an absolute rule, merely
because the jury must then hear evidence as to the value of the subject
promised? It would appear not.12 Admittedly the question of the
938 Cal. 99 (1869).
10 Cal. Stat. 1850, ch. 114, § 8, p. 267.
11279 Pac. 1019 (Cal. D.C.A. 1929), aff'd, 208 Cal. 493, 282 Pac. 10 (1929).
12 In an action to recover the reasonable value of services rendered the promisor
under an alleged oral contract to compensate by will, the court admitted a will which was
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reasonable value of the services, in most cases, is for the trier of the
facts. In many instances it is difficult to arrive at a reasonable figure.
If admission of the oral contract into evidence would aid the jury in
arriving at that figure, it should clearly be admitted even though it
would necessitate, as a secondary issue, hearing evidence as to the
reasonable value of the land. The answer to the question turns on an
issue independent of the fact that the subject matter of the promise
is either a sum of money or land. It turns upon the elementary issue
of whether the evidence sought to be introduced actually does reflect
the reasonable value of the services.13 If, when the oral contract was
entered into, the length of the term of the services was uncertain and
the promise was to leave an uncertain amount of money or land,'14
two variables are encountered. It is to the extent that these two var-
iables reflect a reasonable value placed on the services, that the ad-
missibility of the terms of the oral contract for this purpose become
dependent. If the period over which the services are to extend is cer-
tain and the promised compensation is either a specified sum or a
specified parcel of land, since computation would then be more or
less a mechanical process, it should be clearly admissible. Where the
contract involves one or two of these variables, the more reasonable
rule would leave it to the discretion of the trial judge as to whether
or not the evidence of the oral contract tends to reflect the reasonable
value of the services in question and accordingly whether or not to
admit or exclude the evidence, rather than flatly exclude all such evi-
dence. Such discretion would then be reviewable only for abuse.
Accrual of Cause of Action -Three Theories
When the statute of limitations is drawn into question, the addi-
tional problem of the date of the accrual of the cause of action in
quasi-contract is squarely in issue.15 Once the cause of action is recog-
nized, there are three apparent theories and equally as many judicial
holdings. They are:
1. The cause of action accrues from time to time on the rendition
of the services;
not subject to probate as evidence of the reasonable value of the services. The will pur-
ported to devise certain interests in land to plaintiff along with certain bequests. Ap-
parently the court did not here feel that the creation of this secondary issue defeated its
utility. Mayborne v. Citizens' Trust & Sav. Bank, 46 Cal. App. 178, 188 Pac. 1034 (1920).
13 See Quirk v. Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 244 Fed. 682 (6th Cir. 1917).
24 Care must be taken not to apply the contract "price" which contemplated full per-
formance as evidence of the reasonable value of a partial performance without first
making an adjustment allocating the appropriate pro rata share, so as to accurately reflect
the reasonable value placed on the part performance, where possible.
5 CAL. CODE Civ. PRoC. § 312: "Civil actiohs, without exception, can only be com-
menced within the periods prescribed in this title, after the cause of action shall have
accrued .. " The cause of action accrues when a suit may be maintained thereon, and
the statute of limitations therefore begins to run at that time. Dillion v. Board of Pension
Comm'rs, 18 Cal. 2d 427, 116 P.2d 37, 136 A.L.R. 800 (1941).
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2. The cause of action accrues on the termination of the services,
and;
3. The cause of action accrues only when the oral contract, pur-
suant to which the services were rendered, is breached.
Courts which give countenance to the first above mentioned the-
ory, that the cause of action accrues from time to time on the rendition
of the services, ignore the existence of the oral contract for any pur-
poses of the statute of limitations.' 6 They refuse to allow reference
of the services performed to the oral contract to establish their con-
tinuity. The assertion is that as the services are performed, a benefit
has been conferred for which the performing party can recover in a
quasi-contractual action. And yet, the oral contract can be introduced
into evidence for the limited purpose of establishing the existence of
the cause of action itself by showing that the services were not gratu-
itously rendered. 17 As a logical proposition, the sanctity of this addi-
tional element is difficult to see. This rule apparently is an attempt
at compromise between the flagrantly unjust result of allowing the
promisor to obtain without liability services performed by the promisee
in good faith reliance upon the oral contract and an unfounded fear of
enforcing the oral contract. The result of this theory is the creation
of a hard and fast rule which at any particular point in time bars the
right to recover beyond the statutory period. This is so regardless of
the intention of the parties that the performance was rendered as part
of the whole contemplated performance for which the promisor was
to compensate by will, and regardless of the extent of the benefit
conferred. The Statute of Frauds is thus made to qualify the applica-
tion of the statute of limitations by completely limiting the situation
to which it can apply. The result appears to nullify one of the most
pervasive rules in the law of the Statute of Frauds-that the Statute
was enacted to prevent fraud, rather than promote it. As long as the
performing party continues in good faith to perform and fails to repudi-
ate the oral contract, the statute of limitations bars recovery beyond
the statutory period. The effect is to permit the promisor to take ad-
vantage of the performing party, die without making the will called
for in the oral contract, and leave his estate liable only for those services
which have been performed prior to the running of the statutory period
when the performing party brings his action. The performing party
is forced to choose between performing the contract in good faith, and,
if the performance so rendered continues for longer than the statutory
16 Murphy v. Bums, 216 Wis. 248, 257 N.W. 136 (1934); Leiser v. Pagel, 172 Wis.
530, 179 N.W. 796 (1920) (overruling all inconsistent authority); Taylor v. Thieman, 132
Wis. 38, 111 N.W. 229 (1907).
17 "But where there is an oral promise to compensate by a devise of real estate in
whole or in part, the agreement is utterly void, and can be resorted to for no purpose
except to rebut the presumption, where it exists, that the services were gratuitously ren-
dered." Owen, J. in Leiser v. Pagel, supra note 16 at 535, 179 N.W. at 798.
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period, remain without a remedy to that extent, or to repudiate the
terms of the oral contract and sue the promisor on the basis of quasi-
contract at a time when the benefit conferred cannot properly be
considered an unjust enrichment. For, up until this time, the promisor
has only received part performance of that which the parties originally
contemplated to be the agreed exchange. If the promisor receives no
more than this, and the date set for his performance has not yet arisen,
there is little basis for claiming that the retention of a part of the agreed
exchange constitutes such an enrichment, at the expense of the per-
forming party, as to at that time be classified as unjust. Accordingly,
few jurisdictions have adopted this theory.
The second theory, that the cause of action accrues on the termi-
nation of the services, unlike the first, gives full recognition to the
unjustness of allowing the promisor to receive the benefit of the services
performed, with no liability, and accordingly allows the performing
party to recover for all of the services which have been continuously
performed in reliance upon the oral contract. The oral contract is ad-
mitted into evidence to establish that the rendition of the services
constituted a single parcel of performance in return for the promised
consideration. 18 The statute of limitations begins to run from the date
of the termination of the continuous services. 9
The majority of cases which fall into this category of the Statute of
Frauds seem to call for the services to be performed until the death
of the promisor rather than for performance until a specified date. In
this factual context it is apparent that the date of the termination of
the services is the same as the date of the breach of the contract by the
promisor's dying without leaving the contracted for will. To this extent
the second theory and third-that the cause of action accrues only
when the oral contract, pursuant to which the services were rendered,
is breached-reach the very same result. It is exactly at the time when
the promisor breaches the oral contract that the performance which
he has accepted has become an unjust enrichment. At that time the
injustice is determined, for at any prior date there has been only a
performance of the agreement. If the promisor does carry forth his
bargain, can it be said that at the very moment before the valid will
becomes eligible for probate that the promisor has been unjustly en-
riched? Surely not, for the time for his performance, as was seen above
in the discussion of the first theory, had not yet arisen. But the result
reached by the second theory, in this case, is due to a factual coin-
18 See Longhofer v. Herbel, 83 Kan. 278, 111 Pac. 483 (1910).
29 Engelbrecht v. Herrington, 101 Kan. 720, 172 Pac. 715 (1917) (dictum). See
Heine v. First Trust Co., 141 Kan. 370, 41 P.2d 767 (1935) (alternative holding: contract
not to be performed within one year). If this issue was squarely before the Kansas court
today and the terms of the oral contract were clearly proved, it appears doubtful whether
the above theory, if ever the settled law in that jurisdiction, would be followed. See
Parker v. Ray, 180 Kan. 634, 306 P.2d 190 (1957).
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cidence. When the oral contract calls for performance until a specified
date short of the promisor's death, the statute of limitations commences
to run from the date of termination of performance, and yet the time
for performance by the promisor has not arrived. Apparently this
would be true even if the terms of the oral contract were clearly and
definitely proved.
The justification for the second theory is an attempt to minimize
the possibility of plundering the estate of the deceased by the fraudu-
lent assertion of a claim based upon a contract which is the result of
perjured testimony.20 It is felt that the silence of a party after the
continuous services have been terminated and which can only be
explained by parol proof, leaves too much of an opportunity to the
unscrupulous. The services rendered are extrinsic facts which can more
readily be proved or disproved, and reference of the services to the
unenforceable oral contract to establish their continuity does not in-
volve the same degree of opportunity for fraud as is involved when
there is a substantial gap in time between the performance of the
services and the assertion of the claim. In the latter case, work ren-
dered in the distant past almost carries the presumption that the party
so performing has been compensated for them, but his silence is con-
sistent with the existence of a contract. Those who would apply this
theory evidently feel that the evidential aspects do not warrant a dif-
ferent result.
This attempt, by use of the second theory, to strike a balance be-
tween the conflicting interests of allowing the performing party to
recover the reasonable value of his entire performance, and that of
protecting the estate of the decedent from fraudulent claims, though
far superior to the first theory discussed, would seem to be too harsh.
It forces the performing party to repudiate the oral contract which,
by the better view, is a valid agreement between the parties but unen-
forceable by action in the courts, and requires the promisor to pay the
reasonable value of the services before he has been unjustly enriched.
This type of agreement is usually entered into by elderly persons who
not only desire, but are in actual need of the services of the performing
party. In many such cases these persons can not afford to hire the
services done, as in the usual case of employment; thus this type of
contract allows them to obtain the services and still retain their meager
estates during life. To force the promisor then to pay the reasonable
value of the services prior to his death is to completely destroy the
value of this type of contract when it is oral. The answer, of course,
is to reduce the contract to writing, but when the parties have failed
to do so, does this second theory provide the best result?
In many jurisdictions, the performing party cannot, after the death
20 For a discussion of the fears of plundering decedents' estates, see Arnoldy, Plun-
dering the Estate of Decedents, 12 CAL. S. BA J., 126, 149, 179 (1937).
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of the promisor, himself testify as to the terms of the oral contract.2'
If the courts then require that the terms of the oral contract be clearly
and definitely proved, especially in the case where there is to be per-
formance until a specified date short of the date of the death of the
promisor, the third theory produces the most equitable result when
viewed from both sides, and the weight of authority supports it.22
Ambiguous Position in California and Resolution
The California cases have been somewhat ambiguous as to which
of the above theories has been adopted. Two factors are largely re-
sponsible:
1. Similarity in the fact situation which lends itself to the appli-
cation of either theonies two or three above with the same result; that
is, the promisee is to perform the services for the life of the promisor
in return for compensation by will;
2. A long line, of cases which speak of the statute of limitations
starting to run on the termination of the services.
Confusion of Theories; Long v. Rumsey
There are many cases in California which permit a party who has
rendered services in performance of an oral contract within this sec-
tion of the Statute of Frauds to recover the reasonable value of the
services without requiring that the plaintiff prove the terms of the
unenforceable contract.23 All that the plaintiff need prove is (a) that
the services were continuously rendered, 24 and (b) that from all of
21 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1880 (3). For an extended discussion of this code pro-
vision, advocating repeal thereof and adoption of the South Dakota-Connecticut approach,
see Chadbourn, History and Interpretation of the California Dead Man Statute: A Pro-
posal for Liberalization, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 175 (1957).
22 E.g., Goodloe v. Goodloe, 116 Tenn. 252, 92 S.W. 767, 8 Ann. Cas. 112 (1906);
Cochran v. Bise, 197 Va. 483, 90 S.E.2d 178 (1955); RESTATEMIENT, CONTRACTS § 355
(4) (1932); 2 CoRnm, op. cit. supra note 7, §329; 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 2028 (rev.
ed. 1938); 1 WOOD, LmvfrrAnoNs OF ACTIONS AT LAw Am IN EQUITY § 119 b(2) (4th
ed. 1916). See cases collected Annot., 8 Ann. Cas. 113 (1908).
23 See e.g., Estate of Rohrer, 160 Cal. 574, 117 Pac. 672, Ann. Cas. 1913A 479
(1911); Turell v. Anderson, 16 Cal. App. 2d 445, 60 P.2d 906 (1936); Wax v. Adair, 16
Cal. App. 2d 393, 60 P.2d 904 (1936); Burr v. Floyd, 137 Cal. App. 692, 31 P.2d 402
(1934); Lauritsen v. Goldsmith, 99 Cal. App. 671, 279 Pae. 168 (1929); Warder v.
Hutchison, 69 Cal. App. 291, 231 Pac. 563 (1924).
24 "The word 'continuously'. . . means, 'With continuity or continuation, unbrokenly,
uninterruptedly; without intermission or cessation; without intervening time, implying an
unbroken sequencel" Belletich v. Pollack, 75 Cal. App. 2d 142, 146, 171 P.2d 57, 60
(1946). But where the "continuity" is broken, the statute begins to run on the first part
when the services were terminated, in absence of proof of the oral contract. Demartini v.
Katz, 49 Cal. App. 2d 67, 120 P.2d 944 (1942). Thus where the "continuity" is in fact
broken, resort must be had to the terms of the oral contract in order to establish that the
services were rendered as part of the bargain in a single contract to be compensated by
will. Seib v. Mitchell, 10 Cal. App. 2d 91, 52 P.2d 281 (1935). But the temporary cessa-
tion of the services due to the wrongful act of the promisor does not break the "continu-
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the circumstances it can be inferred that the party who received the
benefit of the services was to pay for them at their termination.2 5
Some of the cases assert that all that need be shown is the continuity
of the services and a fair inference from all of the circumstances that
payment was to be made and under these circumstances the law will
imply a promise to pay at the termination of the services .2  A close
reading of the particular facts in each case, along with the presumption
of a monthly hiring at a reasonable monthly wage contained in the
California Labor Code27 shows that something more is needed.2 8 It
appears that there must be evidence presented from which one could
reasonably infer that payment was to be made for the services at their
termination.29 Thus proof short of the establishment of the terms of
the unenforceable contract will support recovery in this type of case.3 0
The opportunity to confuse this line of cases, which speak of the
statute of limitations commencing to run on the termination of the
continuous services, with the second theory above discussed is appar-
ent. There is, however, a crucial distinction. The second theory creates
a rule of law which is applied when the oral contract is clearly and
definitely proved, the contract being admissible (1) to establish that
the services were not gratuitously rendered; (2) as evidence of the
reasonable value of the services; and (3) to establish that the services
were rendered in performance of the contract as a single parcel for
the promised consideration. On the other hand, in the cases presently
being considered the oral contract need not be proven if the elements
above discussed are present. These cases neither affirm nor negate the
application of either theories two or three above because the factual
context would lead to the same result regardless of which approach
was applied.
However, in Long v. Rumsey3' the facts were such as to require a
distinction to be drawn. The plaintiff alleged that he had performed
services until the agreed specified date pursuant to an oral contract
to be compensated by will. The lapse of time between the date of the
termination of the services and the death of the alleged promisor was
ity." Lloyd v. Kleefisch, 48 Cal. App, 2d 408, 120 P.2d 97 (1941). Compare Konchina
v. Turner's Estate, 154 Cal. App. 2d 134, 315 P.2d 723 (1957); Collier v. Landram, 67
Cal. App. 2d 752, 155 P.2d 652 (1945).
25 Lloyd v. Kleefisch, supra note 24.
26 Mayborne v. Citizen's Trust & Say. Bank, 46 Cal. App. 178, 188 Pac. 1034 (1920).
27 CAL. LABOR CODE § 3002.
28 Corato v. Corato's Estate, 201 Cal. 155, 255 Pac. 825 (1927).
29 Robinson v. Chapman, 98 Cal. App. 278, 276 Pac. 108 (1929). But see Johnstone
v. E. & J. Mfg. Co., 45 Cal. App. 2d 586, 114 P.2d 658 (1941). See also Tabata v.
Murane, 24 Cal. 2d 221, 148 P.2d 605 (1944).
30 Where there is no evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that the
continuous services were to be paid for on termination, the oral contract must be proved.
Ferrari v. Mambretti, 58 Cal. App. 2d 318, 136 P.2d 326 (1943).
31 12 Cal. 2d 334, 84 P.2d 146 (1938).
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longer than the period of the statute of limitations. Plaintiff argued
that his action was not barred by limitations because his cause of action
did not accrue until the promisor died without leaving the contracted
for will. The court rejected his argument and held that the statute of
limitations 32 had barred his action, not however on an application of
the second theory, but because plaintiff had not clearly and definitely
proved the terms of the oral contract. The court then cited the Cali-
fornia cases which speak of the statute of limitations as running on the
termination of the services. The decision in Long v. Rumsey did little
to clarify the law in California in this respect, but did suffice to warn
counsel that when there was a gap between performance of the parties
the terms of the oral contract must be clearly and definitely set forth, or
an adverse ruling on the basis of the statute of limitations might ensue.
Adoption of Third Theory
Some of the cases subsequent to Long v. Rumsey have been equally
ambiguous as to what theory has been applied,3 3 but several very re-
cent cases have definitely settled the question.3 4 California has adopted
the third theory. Where the terms of the unenforceable contract are
clearly and definitely proved the statute of limitations does not begin
to run, in an action for the reasonable value of the services performed
pursuant to a promise to compensate by will, until the oral contract
is breached. And this is true whether the plaintiff breaches the con-
tract s or whether the defendant breaches the contract,30 either by
anticipatory repudiation 7 or by failure to leave the contracted for
will on his death .3
Manner, Incidents, Effect of Breach - Third Theory
How is the breach determined? For this purpose the oral contract
is treated exactly as an enforceable contract and the applicable con-
tract law is applied to determine if there has been a breach of the
contract.39 This is clear enough. The Statute of Frauds creates a de-
32 CAL. CODE CrV. PRoc. § 339 (1).
33 E.g., Beard v. Melvin, 60 Cal. App. 2d 421, 140 P.2d 720 (1943).
34 Vito v. McDonald, 179 Cal. App. 2d 509, 3 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1960); Rooney v. Sul-
livan, 169 Cal. App. 2d 432, 337 P.2d 543 (1959). Both cases cited RESTATEmENT, CON-
TRACTS § 355 (4) (1932).
S5 Laffey v. Kaufman, 134 Cal. 391, 66 Pac. 471 (1901) (oral contract to convey);
Thompson v. Schurman, 65 Cal. App. 2d 432, 150 P.2d 509 (1944) (oral contract to
convey).
36 See cases cited note 22 supra.
37 Maddox v. Rainoldi, 163 Cal. App. 2d 348, 329 P.2d 599 (1958) (citing RESTATE_-
mmTr, CoNTauAcvs § 355 (4) (1932) ). Tipple v. Tipple, 189 App. Div. 28, 177 N.Y.
Supp. 813 (1919) (citing Hochester v. De la Tour, 2 El. & Bl. 678, 118 Eng. Rep. 922
(Q. B. 1853) ). See Campbell v. Campbell, 65 Barb. 639 (N.Y. 1866). See also Lloyd
v. Kleefisch, 48 Cal. App. 2d 408, 120 P.2d 97 (1941).
38 See note 34 supra.
39 See e.g., Murdock v. Swanson, 85 Cal. App. 2d 380, 193 P.2d 81 (1948); Parady
v. Lewis, 338 Mass. 800, 157 N.E.2d 531 (1959); Meyers v. Teitelbaum, 19 Misc. 2d
1080, 193 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1959).
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fense to an action on the oral contract rendering the contract unen-
forceable, but the defense must be asserted in the appropriate manner.
Thus prior to the filing of the action and the raising of the defense, or
if the defense is not asserted, it is seen that the law of enforceable
contracts is applied to the oral contract to determine if the contract
has been breached. The subsequent imposition of the Statute as a
defense does not alter the applicable rules of law.
What are the incidents of the breach? They are the same as they
would be if the unenforceable contract was in fact an enforceable
contract. Thus, assuming that the plaintiff materially and substantially
breached the oral contract, the defendant would be excused from per-
forming on his side.40
What is the effect of the breach? The effect of the breach is to
alter the legal relations between the parties in respect to the quasi-
contractual action to the same extent that it would do so if the contract
under which the performance was rendered was enforceable. 41 The
fact that the oral contract is within the Statute of Frauds should not
put the plaintiff in a better position than he would be in if the contract
is enforceable. 42 It would appear that the purpose of the Statute is
not to penalize performance which is made under an unenforceable
contract, therefore the plaintiff should not be placed in a worse posi-
tion than he would be in if the contract was enforceable. Thus given
a case where, for example, the plaintiff has materially and substantially
breached the oral contract under such circumstances as to be a wilful
breach within the jurisdiction in question, and assuming that the juris-
diction will not allow restitution for part performance when the plain-
tiff is a wilful contract breaker,43 then the plaintiff should, accordingly,
be denied recovery.
This conclusion may be criticized as requiring the plaintiff to per-
form the unenforceable contract unless the plaintiff in default, in the
case of an enforceable contract, could so recover. This is true. Is it
not socially desirable to have all such contracts carried out? Few
would argue that it was not, for under these circumstances there can
be no fraud perpetrated. Yet the plaintiff is being forced to perform
when he has no security that the defendant will likewise perform. Of
course, this is true in most contract cases. While the plaintiff may not
maintain an action for damages, he may recover in quasi-contract when
the defendant breaches the contract.
Nevertheless, there are situations in which a hardship would be
worked on the plaintiff. One such case is where the plaintiff has per-
40 Dubke v. Kassa, 29 Wash. 2d 486, 187 P.2d 611 (1947) (oral contract to convey
land).
41 Dysart v. Remington Rand, Inc., 32 F. Supp. 477 (D.C. Conn. 1940); RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTS §§ 217 (1)(b), and illustration 2, 355 (1) and (4) (1932).4 2 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 355, comments e, f (1932).
43 Ibid.
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formed to a certain date as specified in the oral contract and in return
for compensation by will and the promisor dies after the period of the
statute of limitations, running from the date of the termination of the
services, has lapsed-in short the situation before the court in Long v.
Rumsey. If the plaintiff had brought an action in quasi-contract prior
to the defendant's death, the defendant could have effectively resisted
the action as being premature by setting up the terms of the oral con-
tract in defense. But if the plaintiff waits until after defendant dies
and the statute of limitations has run from the date of the termination
of the services, the plaintiff runs the great risk of receiving an adverse
judgment as in Long v. Rumsey if he is unable to clearly and definitely
prove the terms of the oral contract.
An answer has been suggested. If the plaintiff requests the defend-
ant to execute a writing sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds and
the defendant refuses, the plaintiff may then maintain his action.44
Such a rule is clearly justified. Certainly the defendant cannot assert
that he has not been unjustly enriched when he has refused to merely
execute a writing. The defendant has been receiving the benefit of
the performance of the contract. It would be unjust on his part to
refuse merely to execute a writing so as to enable the plaintiff to secure
the performance due him. If the defendant refuses, it may be treated
as tantamount to a repudiation of the oral contract. The courts would
be justified in applying the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation to the
unenforceable contract and thus allow the plaintiff to presently main-
tain an action against the defendant for the reasonable value of the
services. This would clearly apply when the plaintiff had only partially
performed, but if the plaintiff had fully performed the contract, 45 then
according to a recent California case,46 the doctrine of anticipatory
repudiation would not apply. Perhaps this example illustrates the
necessity for a re-evaluation of the rule that a contract fully performed
on one side cannot be anticipatorily breached. No more can be done
than direct the reader's attention to Professor Corbin's eloquent criti-
cism of the case and the rule it expounds. 47
44 RESTATEMENT, CoNTRACTs §§ 217 (1) (b), 355 (4) (1932); RESTATEmNT, (Sac-
oirm) AGENcY § 468 (3) (1958); WLLIsroT, op. cit. supra note 7, § 538; WOoDwARD,
QuAsi-CoraRAcTs § 98 (1913).
45 Full performance of the services by the plaintiff will not take the oral contract out
of the Statute of Frauds and enable the plaintiff to obtain quasi-specific performance
unless the services are of such a peculiar, extraordinary or exceptional character that it is
impossible to estimate or to adequately compensate for them in money. Kobus v. San
Diego Trust & Say. Bank, 172 Cal. App. 2d 574, 342 P.2d 468 (1959); De Hermosillo v.
Morales, 146 Cal. App. 2d 819, 304 P.2d 854 (1956); Palmer v. Phillips, 123 Cal. App.
2d 291, 266 P.2d 850 (1954); Walker v. Calloway, 99 Cal. App. 2d 675, 222 P.2d 455
(1950); Shive v. Barrow, 88 Cal. App. 2d 838, 199 P.2d 693 (1948) (nor did complaint
state a cause of action for declaratory relief).
46 Minor v. Minor, 184 Cal. App. 2d -, 7 Cal. Rptr. 455 (1960).
474 ConaN, CoNTRAcTs § 966 (pock. part 1960).
May, 1961]
